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Rather than designating the choice between good and evil, my Either/Or desig-
nates the choice by which one chooses good and evil or rules them out.1 
The debates and decisions surrounding virtual reality, cyberspace, 
and other forms of computer-mediated communication have been, 
like so much philosophical reasoning within the Western tradition, 
organized around antinomies. One of the principal concerns in-
volves a conflict between the real world and the computer-gener-
ated simulations that appear to threaten it. As Peter Horsfield de-
scribes it, the question is 
whether the essential characteristics of virtual reality as a reality in which the 
frustrations and disappointments of the actual world do not exist will inevi-
tably lead to a diminishing desire to live in the actual world. So, instead of 
learning the disciplines of living with or changing one’s individual or com-
munal environment, one finds it easier to escape into a reality where these 
practicalities do not exist.2
This apparent conflict between the real and the virtual, and the var-
ious considerations it entails, is perhaps best dramatized in a pivotal 
scene from The Matrix (1999)—the first episode of a cinematic trilogy 
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written and directed by Andy and Larry Wachowski.3 In this scene, 
the leader of the opposition, Morpheus, presents Neo, the protago-
nist, with a decisive choice between two alternatives. “This is your 
last chance,” Morpheus says stoically. “After this, there is no turning 
back. You take the blue pill, the story ends, you wake in your bed, 
and you believe whatever you want to believe. You take the red pill, 
you stay in Wonderland, and I show you how deep the rabbit hole 
goes. Remember all I am offering is the truth. Nothing more.” What 
Morpheus offers Neo in the form of two pills is a choice between 
two very different and opposed possibilities. To select the blue pill is 
to decide not only to live in an immaterial, computer-generated fan-
tasy, but to remain ignorant of the mechanisms of this deception. 
This fantastic virtual world is, if not perfect, at least vastly superior 
to the post-apocalyptic real world that exists outside the Matrix. To 
select the red pill is to choose the truth no matter how disturbing, 
disappointing, and difficult the “desert of the real” might turn out 
to be. It is a choice that affirms the undeniable importance of lived 
experience in a real world that exists outside computer-generated 
simulations. Consequently, what Morpheus offers Neo is a choice 
between competing and radically different alternatives: an absolute-
ly seamless immaterial fantasy, or the reality of the material world. 
It is an important and dramatic decision, and Neo’s choice matters 
for the film, for advocates and critics of computer systems, and for 
our understanding of the social position and impact of technology.
In addressing this matter, I do not want to replay the familiar 
evaluations and arguments that have been publicized about this par-
ticular decision. Anthologies like William Irwin’s The Matrix and Phi-
losophy,4 Glenn Yeffeth’s Taking the Red Pill,5 and Christopher Grau’s 
Philosophers Explore The Matrix6 have already done an adequate job 
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of exposing the philosophical themes involved in Neo’s choice and 
connecting the conceptual dots in this curious hybrid of Platonic 
metaphysics, cyberpunk science fiction, and martial-arts cinema. In-
stead, I want to submit to critical reevaluation the philosophical and 
technological assumptions that have been deployed in and that have 
informed these various writings. Despite differences in methodology 
and interpretation, the “critical writings” on The Matrix employ a set 
of very familiar and remarkably consistent assumptions that remain, 
for the most part, outside the space of critical inquiry. These assump-
tions go deep, and they influence not only the interpretation of this 
particular cinematic narrative, but also our general understanding of 
virtual reality (VR) technology and its philosophical position and 
consequences. To put it in the metaphorical language of the narra-
tive in question, the available understandings of both The Matrix 
films and VR technology are already programmed and controlled by 
a matrix of largely unacknowledged assumptions. We can, on the 
one hand, continue to operate within this structure without ques-
tion or hesitation; in doing so, we would wake in our beds and con-
tinue to believe whatever it is we have believed. On the other hand, 
we can opt to expose the assumptions as such and find out just how 
deep this rabbit hole goes. The following, like the film’s protagonist, 
decides for the latter. But its outcome will lead in an entirely differ-
ent direction. To put it schematically, we can say, paraphrasing Ki-
erkegaard, that rather than being concerned with the choice between 
the red and blue pill, this examination is interested in that decision 
by which one chooses red and blue or rules them out.
Taking the Red Pill
The Matrix is, at its core, a film with a moral plot.7
 Morpheus presents Neo with two alternatives: should Neo decide 
to swallow the blue pill, he will remain within the computer-gener-
ated dream-world of the Matrix and know nothing of his decision 
to do so. Should he decide to swallow the red pill, he will initiate a 
process that is called the “awakening” and eventually come to ex-
perience the “true world” that exists outside the virtual reality that 
is created and sustained by the computer. In the face of these two 
apparently mutually exclusive options, Neo makes what can only 
appear to be the right choice. He decides to swallow the red pill and 
live in the real world and in doing so, he becomes the hero of the 
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narrative. In the face of seemingly impossible odds, he takes control 
of his life, beats the system, gets the girl, and saves the human race 
from machinic domination. That this decision is marked, within the 
space of the film, as the right choice is perhaps best illustrated by 
the way Neo’s actions are differentiated from that of another charac-
ter—Cypher. Cypher is member of Morpheus’s crew, who opts to re-
turn to the computer-generated fantasies of the Matrix and does so 
in such a way that betrays his colleagues. In a scene that functions 
as the antithesis of Neo’s pivotal decision, Cypher makes a deal with 
Agent Smith, while enjoying the pleasures of an artificial, computer-
generated steak: 
Agent Smith: Do we have a deal, Mr. Reagan?
Cypher: You know, I know this steak doesn’t exist. I know that 
when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is 
juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I realized? . . . 
Ignorance is bliss.
Agent Smith: Then we have a deal?
Cypher: I don’t want to remember nothing. Nothing. You under-
stand? And I want to be rich. You know, someone important, like an 
actor.
Agent Smith: Whatever you want, Mr. Reagan.
Cypher: Okay. You get my body back in a Power Plant, reinsert me 
into the Matrix, I’ll get you what you want.
Agent Smith: Access codes to the Zion mainframe.
Cypher: I told you I don’t know them. But I can get you the man 
who does.
Agent Smith: Morpheus.
In return for Morpheus and his knowledge of the access codes, 
Agent Smith agrees to reintegrate Cypher into the Matrix, to erase all 
memory of his experiences on the outside, and to give him whatever 
he wants. Unlike Neo, who decides for the truth, Cypher chooses 
deception, and he does so at all levels. He decides to deceive both his 
friends and himself and to live a life of deception as an actor. Cypher, 
therefore, freely and knowingly decides in favor of a fictional exis-
tence that is cut off from the real life of his community, and—per-
haps what is worse—he does so at its expense. In being portrayed in 
this fashion, Cypher functions as Neo’s dramatic foil. If Neo is what 
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William Gibson terms the “hero of the Real,”8 Cypher is the oppo-
site—the champion of fantasy, self-deception, and fraud. If Neo is 
interpreted as a Christ-like savior,9 Cypher is “the Judas Iscariot of 
the story”10—the traitor who sells out his friends for the sake of self-
ish pleasures. If Neo’s “decision to face ‘the desert of the real’ allows 
him,” as Gerald Erion and Barry Smith argue, “to undertake genuine 
action and have genuine experiences that give his life meaning, and 
thus a moral value,”11 then Cypher is the Schauspieler who is merely 
play-acting in a computer-generated fiction. He is, as Peter Boettke 
concludes, “choosing to not live a human life but to experience a life 
scripted by someone else.”12 If Neo makes what many interpreters of 
the film perceive as the right choice, Cypher’s decision can only be 
judged as “wrong,”13 “foolish,”14 “stupid,”15 and “immoral.”16 In dig-
ital terms, he is the “0” to Neo’s “1.”17 By counter-posing the charac-
ters of Neo and Cypher, The Matrix conforms to a value system that 
equates the good with the real, truth, authenticity, self-knowledge, 
and free choice, and identifies the bad with artifice, fantasy, inau-
thenticity, self-deception, and mechanistic determinism. If The Ma-
trix is at its core a film with a moral plot, then the moral of the story 
appears to be that it is “somehow morally better to face the truth 
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than to live in an illusory world that makes us feel good.”18 And “in 
putting forth this message,” David Weberman argues, “we get an old-
fashioned Hollywood morality tale.”19 
Neo’s decision is immediately recognized as “the correct one,” 
and almost everyone, it seems, identifies with this “hero of the real.” 
As William Irwin, editor of The Matrix and Philosophy, suggests, “the 
red pill is a new symbol of bold choice, and most people insist they 
would take it if they were in Neo’s shoes.”20 This immediate agree-
ment renders his decision less than surprising; in fact, there is some-
thing about his choice that is predictable and almost programmed. 
(And this suspicion is confirmed at the end of the second episode in 
the trilogy, The Matrix Reloaded, where we learn that Neo’s choice is 
neither unique nor unprecedented. In a kind of perverse eternal re-
currence of the same, Neo has made this decision before. In fact, as 
far as the Architect knows, “the One” has done so on at least six 
other occasions.) Consequently, when Morpheus holds out his 
hands, Neo does what we all know he will do: he takes hold of and 
swallows the red pill. This “decision” is predictable for at least two 
reasons. First, it is necessitated by and for the cinematic narrative in 
which this scenario is presented. If Neo had, for some reason, not 
selected the red pill, there would be no “Matrix”—either the one 
encountered by Neo within the film, or the film itself that stages this 
encounter. Morpheus is right: you take the blue pill and the story, 
quite literally in this case, ends. Had Neo decided—or better, had the 
Wachowski brothers, who wrote the script, decided to have Neo de-
cide—to swallow the blue pill, the protagonist would have been re-
turned to the relatively uneventful and mundane computer-simu-
lated 1990s, knowing nothing of his decision to do so. The interesting 
and dramatic set of events that led Neo to Morpheus in the first place 
would come to an abrupt conclusion and be completely eradicated. 
In this way, the dramatic conflict that opens the film and motivates 
its narrative development would dissipate. The film also, as we know 
it, would have to end. Consequently, The Matrix—not just the Matrix 
presented within the frame of the film, but The Matrix that is the 
film—requires and stipulates that Neo take the red pill. It is a dra-
matic necessity.
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Second, Neo’s choice of real truth over illusory deception is “cor-
rect,” because this decision is underwritten and supported by a phil-
osophical matrix that is some 2,400 years old. In swallowing the red 
pill, Neo does not make some exceptional and singular decision 
rooted in the strength of his unique character. The “hero of the real” 
simply reenacts and validates the fundamental decision that is at the 
center of Western thought. Although not always presented in the 
form of two pills, philosophy consistently decides for truth as op-
posed to falsity, being as opposed to appearances, authenticity as 
opposed to inauthenticity, and the real as opposed to illusion. Take, 
for example, Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” a curious fable situated 
at the center of The Republic that is often compared to the experience 
of cinema,21 the technology of virtual reality,22 and the scenario pre-
sented in The Matrix.23 The allegory begins with Socrates describing 
a subterranean cavern inhabited by men who sit before a screen on 
which are projected shadow images. The men are chained in place 
since childhood and are unable to see anything other than these 
artificial projections, which constitute the only reality that is possi-
ble for them to know. At one point, one of the prisoners is released 
and shown the actual source of the shadows—small puppets paraded 
in front of a firelight. Although looking at the light that provides the 
illumination for the images is initially painful and disorienting, the 
prisoner eventually comes to understand “that what he had seen 
before was all a cheat and an illusion.”24  From here, the newly liber-
ated individual is dragged out of the cavern and, once his eyes be-
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come acclimated to the painfully bright sunlight, discovers the “real 
things” that exist outside the fictional projections encountered in 
the subterranean matrix. In comparing the two “realities,” Socrates’ 
prisoner sides with the real and the true, no matter how uncomfort-
able. If given a choice, “he would choose to endure anything rather 
than such a life” inside the cave.25 The allegory, therefore, not only 
stages the opposition of and choice between false illusion and real 
truth, but makes a decision that is remarkably similar to the one 
enacted by Neo.
Similar scenarios and decisions are reproduced with remarkable 
regularity throughout the history of Western philosophy. Robert 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia,26 for example, postulates some-
thing called the “experience machine”—a computer-controlled sys-
tem with electrodes that directly stimulate the user’s central nervous 
system. Nozick’s description of this machine is, as many commenta-
tors have remarked,27 not unlike that illustrated in The Matrix. “Sup-
pose,” Nozick writes, 
there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you 
desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that 
you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, 
or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, 
with electrodes attached to your brain.28 
Given this possibility, he continues, “should you plug into this ma-
chine for life?” In response, he argues that most people, if given 
such an opportunity, would not plug-in: 
First we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing 
them. . . . A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain 
way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone floating in a tank is an indetermi-
nate blob. There is no answer to the question of what a person is like who has 
been in the tank. Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not 
merely that it’s difficult to tell; there’s no way he is. . . . [T]hirdly, plugging 
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into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a world no 
deeper or more important than that which people can construct. There is no 
actual contact with any deeper reality, though the experience can be simu-
lated.29 
Like the decision made in The Republic, Nozick affirms the value 
of true experiences in the real world over illusory deception. For this 
reason, interpreters of The Matrix have used Nozick to explain the 
moral culpability of Cypher’s decision. Lyle Zynda, for example, 
finds in Nozick’s work a compelling case against Cypher’s choice: 
Would you choose to be hooked up to the Experience Machine? Nozick claims 
that you wouldn’t, if you thought about it seriously. You don’t want just the 
experience of having friends and being loved. You want to really have friends 
and be loved. It is true that if you are friendless and unloved, you might be 
tempted to escape reality into fantasy. (Some people use drugs for this reason.) 
But you would prefer real friends to imaginary ones, if you could have them. 
The same goes for fame, wealth, good looks, success, and so on.30
Neo’s decision to swallow the red pill, although having the ap-
pearance of what Irwin calls “a bold choice,” actually conforms to 
and confirms one of the fundamental values of Western thought. It 
is predicated on and underwritten by that general philosophical de-
cision that Friedrich Nietzsche termed “the unconditional will to 
truth.”31  From Plato to Nozick and beyond—from the pre-Socratics 
to contemporary epistemologists, metaphysicians, ethicists, and 
practitioners of everything that goes by the name of science—truth 
is and remains of unconditioned and unquestioned value. “We see,” 
wrote Nietzsche in The Gay Science, 
that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science “without presup-
positions.” The question whether truth is needed must not only been affirmed 
in advance, but affirmed to such a degree that the principle, the faith, the 
conviction finds expression: “Nothing is needed more than truth, and in rela-
tion to it everything else has only second-rate value.”32
Consequently, Neo’s choice to swallow the red pill is one of those 
rare moments when, as Nietzsche described it in the preface to Be-
yond Good and Evil, “the philosopher’s  ‘conviction’ appears on the 
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stage.”33 In this way, The Matrix stages the necessary and all-too-of-
ten unacknowledged decision that is the condition for the possibil-
ity of philosophy and science. Neo’s decision, which takes the form 
of an affirmation of the “value of truth,” is necessarily and unques-
tionably the “right” choice, not simply because of some admirable 
moral character, but because it is the only option that makes sense. 
To have decided otherwise would be, from the perspective of clear 
and rational thinking, nothing less than sheer nonsense. 
Neo is, therefore, in good company. And his decision, one that 
privileges the real and the true over and against artificial illusion, is 
something that is also valued and reproduced by VR researchers and 
critics. Michael Heim, the self-proclaimed “metaphysician of virtual 
reality,” provides a good example of the typical maneuver. His philo-
sophical examinations of VR, published in two books and many an-
thologized essays, point in the direction of all kinds of interesting 
and challenging possibilities. But when push comes to shove, Heim’s 
investigations always fall back on rather traditional and reassuring 
values. For example, at the end of “The Erotic Ontology of Cyber-
space,” an essay included in Michael Benedikt’s Cyberspace: First 
Steps34 and Heim’s The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality,35 Heim reaffirms 
the principal value of truth and the real world that exists outside the 
Matrix. Because this essay was published almost a decade before the 
release of the first episode of The Matrix trilogy, Heim’s text makes 
reference not to the Matrix in the Wachowski brothers’ film or its 
antithesis, the human city of Zion, but to the cyberspace Matrix of 
William Gibson’s Neuromancer and the curiously named “Zionites” 
who inhabit the world outside. The nominal coincidence here be-
tween the elements of the Wachowskis’ cinematic narrative and Gib-
son’s novel is anything but accidental. It not only indicates the ex-
tent to which the Wachowski brothers were influenced by Gibson’s 
ground-breaking work, but, more importantly, outlines the contours 
of a consistent metaphysical structure and ethical decision that un-
derlies cyberpunk science-fiction and the science of VR:
Gibson leaves us the image of a human group that instinctively keeps its dis-
tance from the computer matrix. These are the Zionites, the religiously tribal 
folk who prefer music to computers and intuitive loyalties to calculation. The 
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Zionites constitute a human remnant in the environmental desolation of Neu-
romancer. . . . As we suit up for the exciting future in cyberspace, we must not 
lose touch with the Zionites, the body people who remain rooted in the ener-
gies of the earth. They will nudge us out of our heady reverie in this new layer 
of reality. They will remind us of the living genesis of cyberspace, of the heart-
beat behind the laboratory, of the love that still sprouts amid the broken slag 
and the rusty shells of oil refineries “under the poisoned silver sky.”36
Heim concludes “The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace” by recalling 
the figure of Gibson’s Zionites. We must not, he writes in the im-
perative, lose touch with these intuitive and tactile body people who 
are rooted in the energies of the earth and who abstain from the 
cerebral spectacles staged in the cyberspatial Matrix. According to 
this reading of Neuromancer, the Zionites are contrasted to the cyber-
space cowboys who operate and lose themselves in the Matrix. Like 
the inhabitants of Zion in The Matrix, Gibson’s Zionites live outside 
the Matrix and eschew its computer-generated fantasies. In recalling 
the importance and centrality of the Zionites, Heim appears to make 
what can only be viewed as a wise and reasonable suggestion. If cy-
berspace has the potential to lead us into computer-generated spec-
tacles where we can forget ourselves, the Zionites provide a kind of 
“reality check” that nudges us out of our heady reverie. Despite all 
the fantastic possibilities of VR, Heim still advocates taking the red 
pill. He does so not because he is some kind of neo-Luddite who has 
disdain for the virtual life; rather, he advocates understanding the 
true reality of the situation in order to put the VR experience in its 
proper place and perspective.37 Neo, in fact, makes a similar decision. 
After selecting the red pill, he does not simply pack up his pod, move 
into a derelict apartment in the desert of the real, and get a job at 
some post-apocalypse Starbucks. The choice of truth does not simply 
exclude interactions with illusion tout court; it puts illusion in its 
proper place and perspective. The converse, however, is not true: the 
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choice of illusion completely eclipses and precludes truth. The one 
who decides, like Cypher, to live in a computer-generated hallucina-
tion will remember nothing. In selecting the red pill, therefore, Neo 
is not simply deciding to live outside the Matrix, but is deciding to 
live in such a way that he knows what is and what is not true, what 
is and what is not a computer-generated artifice. It is, for this reason, 
that Neo, like the rest of Morpheus’s crew, is able to enter the Matrix 
willfully and, once inside it, perform seemingly unreal feats. This is 
possible not because he has decided to live outside the Matrix, but 
because, in selecting the red pill and deciding for truth, Neo can in-
teract with the VR world of the Matrix with the self-assured knowl-
edge that it is not real. He can, as Kenneth Rufo describes it, “see the 
Matrix for what it really is.”38 
The Matrix, then, is a parable that connects up with and drama-
tizes values that appear to be unquestioned and undeniable. Its priv-
ilege of the true and real is something that is already affirmed in the 
history of philosophy, and is reinforced by contemporary theorists 
and critics of VR technology. And The Matrix is not the only contem-
porary fable to entertain or to capitalize on this decision; in fact, a 
good number of popular films produced during the last decade of the 
twentieth century seem to be about similar matters. Lawnmower 
Man,39 one of the earliest films to address VR, ends by making a 
similar choice. At the climax of the narrative, the protagonist termi-
nates his ascendancy to virtual immortality and returns to the real 
world to save the life of his friend. As Heim has interpreted it, the 
film ends by affirming the unmistakable importance of the “primary 
world” and the real human relationships that are a part of it. In this 
way, Heim argues that a film like Lawnmower Man “spells out . . . just 
what values should underpin virtual-worlds research.”40 
A similar argument is presented in Peter Weir’s Truman Show,41 
which constitutes something like reality television “turned up to 
eleven.”42  The narrative concerns the life of Truman Burbank, who, 
like Plato’s prisoners and the human batteries wired into the Matrix, 
unknowingly lives his entire life on a television set. The film con-
cludes with the protagonist bravely exiting through the horizon of 
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his artificial environment in order to confront the real and true world 
that exists outside the illusion that had constituted what he thought 
was reality. The Matrix, then, is not alone. In the popular mythology 
of our time, we see and entertain argument after argument for taking 
the red pill. 
The Blue Pill and Beyond
It is less a matter of being pro- or anti-technology, but of developing a critical 
perspective on the ethics of virtuality.43
It seems no one, or almost no one, advocates swallowing the blue 
pill. And even the small number who do, do not question the meta-
physical structure and values that organize the film and direct its 
interpretations. In fact, the few dissenting voices actually reinforce 
the fundamental “will to truth” that is at the core of the narrative, 
even though they appear to question Neo’s choice and even side 
with Cypher. In his essay “You Won’t Know the Difference So You 
Can’t Make the Choice,” Robin Beck evaluates the two options pre-
sented to Neo and concludes that the difference between the blue 
and red pills is negligible and essentially immaterial. “There are,” he 
argues, “no rational grounds for making the decision [because] [e]
pistemologically, the worlds are the same,” given that either world 
would seem “equally real” once one pill or the other had been swal-
lowed.44 For Beck, it simply does not matter which pill is taken; both 
lead to a “reality” that is equally true and real for the individual who 
encounters it. Whether he takes the blue or red pill, Neo will live in 
a “reality” that will be, as far as he knows, absolutely real and un-
questionably true. 
David Weberman goes one step further in his essay, “The Matrix 
Simulation and the Postmodern Age.” Weberman agrees with Beck 
that the decision between blue and red is ostensibly insignificant, 
though he draws an entirely different conclusion:
Of course the whole plot of the film is driven by the noble battle for liberation 
from the tyranny of the machines and their evil Matrix. But the film, despite 
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itself, presents us with two worlds in a way that shows us that Cypher is the 
one who is right. I believe that the only sensible path is to choose the simu-
lated world over the real one.45 
According to Weberman, if there is no appreciable difference be-
tween taking the blue or red pill, then a rational and defensible deci-
sion can be made. One should choose the option that offers the best 
outcome:
The Matrix does not just offer sensual pleasures. It really encompasses much 
more, in fact, it gives us just about everything we could want from the shal-
lowest to the deepest gratifications. Assuming that the machines haven’t made 
things unnecessarily impoverished, the virtual world gives us the opportunity 
to visit museums and concerts, read Shakespeare and Stephen King, fall in 
love, make love, raise children, form deep friendships, and so on. . . . The real 
world, on the other hand, is a wasteland. The libraries and theatres have been 
destroyed and the skies are always gray. In fact, you’d have to be out of your 
mind or at least seriously out to lunch to choose the real world (is that why 
Keanu Reeves seems so well cast in the role?). We’re not talking base hedonism 
now, we’re talking about, to use John Stuart Mill’s words, “the higher facul-
ties” and the deep and diverse types of gratifications derived from them. Such 
gratification is to be found more easily in the Matrix than in the “desert of the 
real.”46 
For Weberman, the quality of life inside the Matrix is simply better 
than that on the outside. And by “quality of life,” he is not simply 
referring to the base hedonistic pleasures that have been associated 
with the character of Cypher. The computer-generated world can 
certainly provide for these shallow gratifications, but it can also run 
simulations that stimulate “the higher faculties,” providing every-
thing we believe makes a human life worth living. Consequently, 
swallowing the blue pill and living life inside the Matrix, despite 
the way this option has been maligned both within the film and 
through its various interpretations, is without question the best de-
cision. And those who choose otherwise are, Weberman believes, 
either out of their minds or out to lunch.
A similar quality of life argument is made by Kevin Warwick, who 
finds Morpheus and his rebel colleagues to be nothing but a bunch 
of reactionary humanists:
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Neo is kidnapped by Luddites, dinosaurs from the past when humans ruled 
the earth. It’s not the future. We are in reality heading towards a world run by 
machines with an intelligence far superior to that of an individual human. But 
by linking into the network and becoming a Cyborg, life can appear to be 
even better than it is now. We really need to clamp down on the party-pooper 
Neos of this world and get into the future as soon as we can—a future in 
which we can be part of a Matrix system, which is morally far superior to our 
Neolithic morals of today.47 
For Warwick, being wired into the machine and becoming a com-
ponent in a “Matrix system” is part of an evolutionary step by 
which human beings surpass the limitations of their biologically 
determined capabilities and become something more—what is of-
ten called “cyborg” or “post-human.” This human/machine conflu-
ence will, Warwick believes, provide a better life and be judged to be 
morally superior to our current situation, which will, in retrospect, 
seem to be prehistoric. Consequently, to resist this evolutionary step 
is, in his estimation, reactionary, nostalgic, and simply unintelligi-
ble. Although Warwick’s argument might appear to be somewhat 
extreme, his position is not unprecedented. Similar descriptions of 
human/machine hybridity and post-human configurations have 
been promoted in J. C. R. Licklider’s “Man/Computer Symbiosis,” 
Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto,” and N. Katherine Hayles’s 
How We Became Posthuman.48 Like Warwick, these scholars suggest, 
as Haraway succinctly describes it, that “the machine is not an it to 
be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our 
processes, an aspect of our embodiment.”49 
These alternative readings of The Matrix challenge the customary 
interpretations by apparently inverting the fundamental decision 
between the red and blue pills. I say “apparently,” because these al-
ternatives, despite their best efforts, do not manage to affect such an 
inversion. If “the fundamental faith of the metaphysicians,” as Ni-
etzsche argued at the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, “is the belief 
in opposite values,”50 then The Matrix is in fact “the most philo-
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sophical film ever made”51 (insofar as its narrative is defined and 
motivated by a distinction between two opposed and mutually ex-
clusive possibilities where the one is clearly valued over the other). 
The film and the majority of its interpretations decide, for example, 
in favor of the red pill over the blue one, the immediate real world 
over computer-mediated simulations, and the “hero of the real” who 
awakens to the truth over the anti-hero who proclaims that “igno-
rance is bliss.” The interpretations offered by Beck, Weberman, and 
Warwick seem to challenge these customary decisions by elevating 
the depreciated terms over and against the ones that have been cus-
tomarily privileged. Such operations would be “revolutionary,” be-
cause they literally “overturn” the customary value system. They 
would, it seems, propose an inversion of traditional metaphysics 
whereby falsity, error, and deception would be valued over truth, and 
fantastic illusions would be given precedence over the real. This, in 
fact, does not occur. The substitution of the blue pill for the red one 
that is suggested in these interpretations is not a revolutionary ges-
ture. Although Beck, Weberman, and Warwick provide alternative 
readings of The Matrix, their analyses remain bounded and struc-
tured by a metaphysical system that adheres to the assumed value of 
real truth. What makes the blue pill attractive, on their accounts, is 
not that it leads to deception, illusion, and falsity; rather, what makes 
it attractive is that it also leads to a world that is just as real and true. 
What they dispute, then, is not the choice of truth over illusion, but 
the fact that the decision between the two pills is presented in a way 
that is not entirely accurate. Despite what Morpheus says, they ar-
gue, the blue pill does not lead to something that is the opposite of 
true reality, but constitutes the doorway to an alternative and pos-
sibly improved reality. Consequently, the issue is not to decide be-
tween reality and deceptive illusion, but to choose between two very 
different kinds of reality: a neo-Luddite existence in the real world of 
the Nebuchadnezzar, or the virtual reality created through a com-
puter.
Even those who advocate swallowing the blue pill, then, still af-
firm the fundamental values of the real and the true over and against 
deceptive illusions. No matter how the film is interpreted, no matter 
who is situated as the hero of the narrative, illusion and deception 
are still regarded with suspicion. But why? What’s the matter with 
illusory deceptions? Why are they so thoroughly devalued that they 
are, almost without question, universally maligned? Should not this 
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absolute exclusion make us just a little apprehensive? Nietzsche is 
one thinker in the Western tradition who questions this seemingly 
universal conviction and moral prejudice. Beginning with The Gene-
alogy of Morals and continuing through intervening works up to and 
including Beyond Good and Evil, he sought not only to expose the 
unquestioned prejudices and unacknowledged decisions that struc-
ture Western thought, but to challenge their hegemony. It is in The 
Gay Science that these misgivings are perhaps best articulated: 
This unconditional will to truth—what is it? Is it the will not to allow oneself to 
be deceived? Or is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could be inter-
preted in the second way, too—if only the special case “I do not want to de-
ceive myself” is subsumed under the generalization “I do not want to deceive.” 
But why not deceive?52 
In asking these questions, Nietzsche not only exposes one of the 
moral prejudices of philosophy, which always decides in favor of 
the true, but inquires about the almost universal exclusion of de-
ception. “Why do you not want to deceive,” Nietzsche asks provoc-
atively, “especially if it should seem—and it does seem!—as if all 
of life aimed at semblance, meaning error, deception, simulation, 
delusion, self-delusion, and when the great sweep of life has actu-
ally always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous 
polu´tropoi´.”53 Here, in his use of the Greek word πολu´τροποi´ (“poly-
tropoi”), Nietzsche reiterates one of the many epithets of Odysseus, 
whom Homer presents as the hero of “many turns,” master of de-
ceptions, disguises, and tricks.54 According to Nietzsche, then, it is 
virtuosity in deception that is necessary for survival, while the “will 
to truth”—the will to avoid deception at any cost—is a disposition 
that is antithetical and even hostile to life. The “will to truth,” Ni-
etzsche wrote, “that might be a concealed will to death.”55 
A similar form of critical reflection is situated in the context of The 
Matrix, voiced by the only character who can occupy such a thor-
oughly skeptical position—Cypher: “You know, I know what you’re 
thinking ‘cause right now I’m thinking the same thing. Actually, to 
tell you the truth, I’ve been thinking the same thing ever since I got 
here. Why, oh why, didn’t I take the blue pill!?” Cypher reflects on 
the burden and danger of having taken the red pill.  In his estima-
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tion, the “will to truth” is both a painful disappointment and a death 
sentence. And he not only asks the critical question, he acts on it. For 
this reason, his character is situated as a defector and traitor: he not 
only “betrays Neo and his disciples,”56 but he also betrays the un-
questioned faith in and the unconditional will to truth. Conse-
quently, Cypher is, like Nietzsche, the blasphemer of metaphysics 
who, through a gesture that can only appear to be ethically suspect 
and metaphysically foolish, puts in question the seemingly irrefut-
able value of truth.
Cypher’s actions seek and end with a reversal of Neo’s affirmation 
of the real and the true. He questions the value of the true world, asks 
to be returned to the computer simulations of the Matrix, and wants 
to live the life of an actor. Nietzsche, it seems, charts a similar course. 
He also questions the “will to truth,” is intrigued by the actor’s “de-
light in simulation” and “craving for appearances,”57 and seeks to 
reverse the traditional value system that has defined Western phi-
losophy.58 Nietzsche, however, was not satisfied with mere reversal; 
he knew, as both Heidegger (1978) and Derrida (1981b) point out, 
that mere inversion essentially changes nothing, because it still oper-
ates, albeit in an inverted form, on the terrain of and from the sys-
tem that is supposedly effected. Consequently, Nietzsche is not a 
mere philosophical revolutionary; he goes one step further and de-
liberately undermines the very logic that defines Western philoso-
phy—that is, he disturbs the rules of the philosophical game, unset-
tling the very logic by which “true being” had been opposed to 
illusory appearances in the first place. This is perhaps most evident 
in the story, included in The Twilight of the Idols, of “How the ‘True 
World’ Finally Became a Fable.” This parable, which proceeds in sev-
eral discrete steps, ends with the following remarkable statement: 
“The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The 
apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abol-
ished the apparent one.”59 Here, Nietzsche moves beyond mere rever-
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sal, undermining and collapsing the very distinction between the 
true world and its apparitional other. According to Mark Taylor and 
Esa Saarinen, 
the point is not simply that truth and reality have been absorbed by illusion 
and appearance. Something far more subtle and unsettling is taking place. 
Somewhere Nietzsche suggests that when reality is effaced, appearances disap-
pear as well. What emerges in the wake of the death of oppositions like truth/
illusion and reality/appearance is something that is neither truth nor illusion, 
reality nor appearance but something else, something other. This other is as 
yet unnamed.60 
Nietzsche’s questioning of the “will to truth” and his skepticism 
concerning the depreciation of deception, does not seek to replace 
one term of the traditional metaphysical dichotomy with the other; 
instead, he questions and undermines the entire system that opposes 
true being and deceptive appearances in the first place. What Nietz-
sche effects, therefore, is not a simple reversal, but a deconstruction61 
of what are perhaps the principal binary oppositions that structure 
the field of philosophical thinking. This operation leaves neither 
truth nor illusion, reality nor appearance, but something other—
something that is beyond and outside of these logical oppositions 
that organizes all possible modes of thinking and that, because of 
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this, exceeds the scope of available names;62 that is, it ruptures the 
very limit of λογος, which, in this case, can be understood as both 
“logic” and “word.”
Technically speaking, this is also what transpires in The Matrix, 
which can be read as film that not only employs but exploits the 
binary oppositions that define traditional metaphysics. In this way, 
the narrative proceeds by drawing distinctions between the red and 
blue pills and deciding in favor of one over the other. All of this, of 
course, is programmed and delimited by the metaphysics of opposite 
values—a metaphysics that not only arranges binary oppositions, 
but determines an ethical schema by privileging one term over the 
other. In The Matrix, the blue pill, which leads to a life of self-decep-
tion in a computer-generated simulation, is both opposed and sub-
ordinated to the red pill, which leads to real knowledge of the truth. 
This arrangement, however, shows itself to be an artifice. If one pays 
attention to the structure of the narrative, the decision that Mor-
pheus offers Neo cannot be, within the metaphysical system articu-
lated by the film, a real alternative or choice; in other words, there is 
neither a blue nor red pill. What appears as a choice between two 
alternatives is itself something that is simulated within the artifice of 
the Matrix. Neo’s encounter with Morpheus takes place in a com-
puter-generated hotel room inside the Matrix, which is, at this point 
in the film, the only reality Neo is capable of understanding. This 
situation is marked explicitly by Morpheus at the beginning of the 
conversation: “The Matrix is everywhere, it’s all around us, here even 
in this room.” Consequently, the choice that Morpheus presents to 
Neo between a programmed artifice and true reality is itself an arti-
fact in a computer-generated simulation. The decision between the 
blue or red pill is something that is staged within and completely 
circumscribed by the Matrix: the two pills, as Peter Lloyd (2003) ar-
gues, are entirely virtual.63 This insight is eventually confirmed in 
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the sequel, The Matrix Reloaded, where it becomes clear to Neo that 
his choice between the red and blue pills was always and already part 
of the Matrix’s own program and operations.
The task, therefore, is not a matter of simply choosing one or the 
other, but of questioning the structure, necessity, and stakes of this 
particular and limited set of alternatives. It is, to paraphrase Kroker 
and Weinstein, less a matter of being pro- or anti-Matrix than of 
developing a critical perspective on the ethics of this very choice.64 
What is at issue in such an undertaking is not deciding either for 
blue or red, but of inquiring about the terms and conditions by 
which this either/or logic has been generated in the first place. The 
issue, then, is not as simple as deciding between two different pills; 
instead, the task is to learn to think outside of and beyond these 
limited options and the customary metaphysical categories that al-
ready dictate the kinds of questions we ask, the alternatives we think 
we have to choose between, and the outcomes that we foresee as 
possible. For instance, instead of selecting between the two pills pre-
sented by Morpheus, Neo could have stood up and walked away 
from the entire scene. In doing so, he would have not selected either 
pill. He would have effectively said “no to drugs” and not consented 
to having his options restricted to a binary opposition where one 
term is already opposed to and privileged over the other. He would, 
therefore, neither have awakened in the “desert of the real” nor have 
been returned to the anesthetized deceptions of the Matrix in which 
“ignorance is bliss.” He would have done something entirely other, 
something that is neither predictable nor revolutionary, something 
outside of and beyond the logical oppositions of truth/falsity, real-
ity/illusion, and good/bad.
A similar opportunity is available in VR research. We can, of 
course, continue to apply the usually metaphysical concepts in order 
to generate an understanding of VR technology and to demarcate 
what is considered acceptable and proper. If we do so, VR will con-
form to rather predictable, calculable, and comfortable norms, be-
coming, as Michael Heim suggests, “Platonism as a working prod-
uct.”65 If, however, the consideration of this technology extends 
beyond the customary categories and values, we can begin to per-
ceive other and perhaps more interesting alternatives. This requires, 
above everything else, a mode of operation that both questions and 
eventually ruptures the limit of the conceptual systems that already 
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214 Configurations
define the possibility of both a metaphysics and ethics of virtual real-
ity. What is needed is an entirely other kind of “metaphysics” and 
“ethics”—perhaps it is problematic to retain these names—that are 
able to interrupt and to operate in excess of the traditional logical 
distinctions that divide truth from illusion, being from appearance, 
and even good from evil. We can find a model for this kind of trans-
action by “returning to the source.” It is in the concluding pages of 
Plato’s Phaedrus that Socrates encodes the evaluation of the technol-
ogy of writing in a binary structure, employs the figure of the 
φaρμa’ κον (drugs) to illustrate the two options, and limits discussion 
to this rather restricted binary opposition.66 As long as evaluations of 
scriptural technology remain organized and delimited by the two 
alternatives that are presented by Socrates, writing will be under-
stood according to a structure that has already stacked the deck 
against it; in other words, if writing is positioned, as it is at the end 
of Phaedrus, as the deficient and negatively defined “other” of mem-
ory and speech, it can only be the wrong choice—the equivalent of 
swallowing the blue pill. The critical task, one taken up by writers 
such as Stéphane Mallarmé, Roland Barthes, Maurice Blanchot, 
Jacques Derrida, Trinh T. Minh-ha, and others, is not simply to re-
verse the tradition, replacing the logocentric privilege of memory 
and speech with a revolutionary privileging of writing. This kind of 
simple-minded inversion changes nothing and, as Walter Ong cor-
rectly points out, would be an “uncritical literacy”;67 instead, the task 
is to learn to think writing and to be able to write writing outside of 
and beyond the horizon of this logocentric metaphysics. Similarly, 
the task before VR theorists and practitioners is to learn to think and 
visualize VR outside of and beyond the binary oppositions that have 
all too often been employed to structure understandings of this tech-
nology. Indicative of this kind of alternative procedure is the work of 
Mark Taylor, for whom VR, like many of the technical terms intro-
duced in post-structuralism, cannot be contained by or understood 
according to the customary metaphysical categories:
Previous responses to virtual reality reinscribe oppositions like mind/body, 
human/machine, natural/artificial, and material/immaterial, which the long 
process of virtualizing reality subverts. What once seemed to be hard-and-fast 
66. Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1990),  pp. 274c–275a. See also Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
67. Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy (New York: Routledge, 1982), p. 169.
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oppositions now appear to be interfaces in which neither term remains the 
same. Virtual reality involves neither the synthesis of opposites nor the sup-
pression of one term by the other but gives rise to a different order of “reality” 
that eludes traditional classificatory structures.68 
According to Taylor, VR, which he argues is not just a technology 
but also an effective figure of the postmodern condition,69 does not 
take up residence on either one side or the other of the conceptual 
oppositions that have organized and programmed Western systems 
of meaning. It, therefore, is neither located on the side of the real nor 
is it situated as its opposite. It also does not, following the procedure 
of Hegelian philosophy, mediate or synthesize this difference; in-
stead, it is situated completely outside and in excess of the either/or 
possibilities that have been programmed by the binary oppositions 
that define and characterize Western metaphysics. This third term, 
therefore, does not participate in the dialectical game of either/or, 
but exceeds and even circumscribes its rules. In the end, we can say 
that to come full circle and return to the quotation from Kierkegaard 
with which this all began, that rather than designating a choice be-
tween the real and the virtual, the decision before VR theorists and 
practitioners is whether to continue to operate within this dialectic, 
or to rule it out and proceed to investigate opportunities that are 
otherwise. 
68. Mark C. Taylor, Hiding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 302–303.
69. Ibid., p. 303.
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